Tract 0: Cultural Experimentation is the Key to Saving Our Species

Our podcast, Based Camp, focuses on the topics of sex, politics, genetics, and religion. The first three are understandable obsessions for leaders of the pronatalist movement but the last often perplexes newcomers. Religion? This confusion is amplified when they ask why we haven’t written a book on pronatalism and realistic solutions to falling fertility rates and we point out that we have and it's titled The Pragmatist’s Guide to Crafting Religion.

The great thing about being an American and exploring the problem of crashing fertility rates is that most of the developed world is further along the path to demographic collapse than we are, which allows us to see what has and hasn’t worked.

The “obvious” solutions to falling fertility rates simply don’t work. You can’t buy fertility: Hungary spent 5% of its GDP attempting to do this one year and only rose fertility rates by 1.6%, a laughable figure in a world where rates are falling annually by double digit percentages in dozens of countries. What’s more, if you line up all the studies looking at whether financial incentives boost fertility rates, you see a clear association between the proposed effect size and the margin of error.

Is there some amount we could pay people to get them to have kids? Of course. Is there an amount a government would be able to pay (i.e., something that would pass in Congress) that would make a significant difference? The answer is no. Anyone telling you otherwise is either not familiar with the data or is lying to you in an effort to promote some other agenda.

Shifting the culture is the obvious way to save our species from the self-induced extinguishing of our most productive members. Yet actually doing so is not entirely straightforward. One’s first intuition when observing that conservative religious populations have more children within countries is to assume that imposing their beliefs on the population level is the solution. But then one sees that the more conservative a country’s average citizen, the lower its fertility rate, as Aria Babu has shown. Imposing conservative values through governments fiat does not appear to work and may even be counter-productive.

The failure of universal conservative values to sustainably raise birth rates is likely driven by the same process that leads to native ethnic groups having higher fertility rates in ethnically and culturally diverse countries than in ethno-states or mono-cultures (when controlling for prosperity). That's right: an ethnic group that seeks to counteract low fertility by restricting immigration is actually speeding up its extinction. The reason for this, I suspect, is that high fertility requires not just a strong, religiously infused culture but one whose members feels like a threatened minority that is starkly different from its neighbours. This would explain the perplexingly high Jewish Israeli fertility rates.

I suspect there are two major forces at play. The first is just common sense. If you have daily reminders that people who look, act, and think like you might be “replaced”, that is a strong motivation to have kids. In a country like South Korea (where I used to live) almost everyone you see and interact with shares your culture and ethnicity, so there is no daily feeling of existential threat. Think of it like a fertility-cultural version of the bystander effect.

The second force at play is more subtle. When a government imposes a culture’s value system, the forces of intergenerational cultural evolution that made the culture strong in the first place begin to atrophy. If a person lived their life in a mech suit which moved their body for them, all their muscles would eventually atrophy.

Cultures that maintained prohibitions on porn had more intramarital sex and thus more children. Yet they also taught self-control, which strengthens the inhibitory pathways in the prefrontal cortex. So when a country does something like ban porn outright (as South Korea has done) then consuming porn is no longer a personal choice where one affirms one’s cultural traditions; it is simply the law of the land. To see this effect in action just look at the correlation within the EU between how much a country restricts access to abortion to its fertility rate. Abortion restrictions are a good proxy for how much the government is enforcing value systems/perspectives that religions should be enforcing on their own. Removing the responsibility from a religion to motivate individuals to exercise self-control will destroy that religion over time.

If religion is the answer, why not just go back to one of the old ones? While religious communities have shown more resistance to fertility collapse than their secular counterparts, they too are dying. For example, Catholic majority countries in Europe have an average fertility rate of only 1.3—a rate that will see them almost halving in population every generation! Things are not much better in Catholic majority Latin America:

As recently as 2019, a benchmark study by the United Nations Population Division for 2020 to 2100 forecast that fertility in Latin American and Caribbean countries would stabilize at an average of around 1.75 children per woman in the latter half of this century. Stunningly, except for Mexico, all the countries listed in this graph have already dropped below this level. Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, Jamaica, and Cuba now have total fertility rates of around 1.3 children per woman—the so-called “ultra-low fertility” threshold that has only been seen in a handful of European and East Asian countries.

Catholics are not the only religious group in which fertility rates are plummeting. One can observe the same delayed fertility crash across almost all religious groups. Even historically high-fertility groups like Mormons fell below the replacement rate and will eventually disappear without a change.“ The Mormon fertility rate is harder to calculate than other populations’ fertility rates, but there is evidence of a substantial decline. Even Muslims are not immune to this trend, with their fertility rates sometimes falling below other groups’ when they are in monocultural communities. (Iran’s fertility crisis is an obvious example.)”

One might point out that there are often high-fertility sub-populations within religious communities. The problem is that they tend to be less economically and intellectually productive. These low-productivity, high-fertility groups are much more damaging to religious communities than they are to secular society, as there is much more interbreeding between their members and those of the low-fertility, high-productivity groups. (There is one study arguing that this is not the case in some Mormon communities, but the correlation s